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Abstract 
Already for more than a decade there has been a discussion on how to define 
prices of geo-information. We pose that rather than focusing this discussion on 
the geo-information itself, it is important to consider the contextual conditions 
which contribute to price establishment and their acceptance by involved 
individuals and organizations. As geo-information is usually embedded into inter-
organizational relations (IORs), the geo-information use is affected by the 
‘relationality’ of the internal and the external context in which the organizations 
operate. Both these influences justify using infrastructural aspects as conceptual 
lenses to examine when prices are established and when they are consolidated. 
We explored these infrastructural aspects in three cases of IORs in the 
Netherlands. The cases show that the dynamics across IORs can reveal relevant 
aspects of price development and price setting of geo-information.  We conclude 
therefore that the IORs act as anchoring mechanism for prices. 
 
Keywords: geo-information, spatial data infrastructure, value, price 
 
                                                
∗ This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non commercial Works 3.0 
License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/  or 
send a letter to Creative Commons, 543 Howard Street, 5th Floor, San Francisco, California, 
94105, USA. 
 
DOI: 10.2902/1725-0463.2010.05.art3 
International Journal of Spatial Data Infrastructures Research, 2010, Vol. 5, 77-95 
 78
1. INTRODUCTION 
Currently the approaches towards defining and evaluating the value of geo-
information are dichotomous: one side of the dichotomy views the value of geo-
information in its entirety, such as the value of a national Spatial Data 
infrastructure (SDI), and one side looks at price setting and conditions 
surrounding specific, individual geo-information products and services (like maps 
or images). The articles by de Vries and Beerens (2002) and Lance et al. (2009) , 
the INSPIRE state of play reports *  , the comparative study by Craglia and 
Campagna (2009) and the advisory policy reports by Pricewaterhouse (1995) 
and Ordnance Survey (1996) are examples of the former. The discussions by 
Blakemore and Sutherland (2005) and Groot (2001) are examples of the latter. In 
addition, the polemics on “fee or free” access to spatial information, originally a 
divide between European and North American access policies (Masser, 1999), 
and later brought into a broader discussion of access (van Loenen, 2009) are 
also part of this latter discussion, because they focus on (single or bulk) prices of 
individual products. The question whether there exists a relation between the 
national accounts of geo-information and the price setting for specific, individual 
geo-information products or services is however a dilemma in the debates about 
the value of geo- information.  This dilemma is twofold: 
1) Can we measure the actual value of individual geo-information products 
with price, knowing that the users of such products value the same 
product differently over time? (Rhind, 1992) noted: Perhaps the single 
most vital issue with respect to digital spatial data at present time is that 
its utility and value are often most highly related to the expertise, 
knowledge and imagination of the purchaser and the exploiter. In such 
cases, "normal" relationships between supply, demand and pricing may 
be well distorted. (Rhind, 1992). Not surprisingly, this has resulted in a 
wide variety of pricing models and contexts (see (Longhorn and 
Blakemore, 2008)). 
2) Can we decompose or aggregate such changing values to an extent that 
one can generate patterns relating to the overall value of geo-information? 
In other words, is there a national value of geo-information? 
Both dilemmas show that measuring the value directly is difficult, if not impossible. 
On the one hand individual prices are not consistent; on the other hand, the 
aggregate value is not tangible, and can therefore not be decomposed. Our 
research started from this dilemma. During the AGILE 2009 conference session 
on geo-information value where an early version of this paper was presented, 
                                                
* http://inspire.jrc.ec.europa.eu/state_of_play.cfm 
International Journal of Spatial Data Infrastructures Research, 2010, Vol. 5, 77-95 
 79
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) was discussed to highlight that value depends on 
existing relations among actors, and that different relations may construct 
different values for the same product. As an example for discussion, one of the 
discussants proposed to compare geo-information value to the seat price on air 
flights. The point was that the prices of air tickets for the same seat change over 
time, and that different people are willing to pay different prices for a number of 
reasons (like special offers, miles credits, travel agencies’ suggestions and fees, 
safety perceptions, language(s) spoken onboard, alternative routes, etc.). Also, a 
same person is likely to opt for different tickets, or even different prices for the 
same seat, at different moments. Apparently, air ticket price setting requires more 
than focusing on the seats themselves (although comfort and space can be 
considered in customers’ choice). From this discussion we realized that geo-
information price setting would require the consideration of the wider 
organizational contexts affecting and creating those prices. On the same line of 
highlighting the organizational dimension, Latour (2005) stated that from the 
artifacts of refund schemes, supply prices, supply chain, market level, season, 
offers, etc. it is clear that air companies fly, not planes alone without the 
organizational setting. So, we propose that in order to understand the behavior of 
buyers and sellers in price setting one needs to look at the broad inter-
organizational relations (IORs) within which they act. The importance of this 
‘relationality’ in organizational studies has been mentioned by Bradbury and 
Lichtenstein (2000), especially in situations when looking at the discrete objects 
or phenomena, such as the price of one organization, or the value of the entire 
SDI, does not provide a direct insight into a phenomenon beyond a single 
organization, such as the value creation or the origin of prices.  
From acknowledging the importance of relationality, at this point we can add a 
note about the disputed non-rivalry nature of geo-data. On one side we accept 
that geo-data, as all data -not only in digital formats - is not a mutual exclusive 
resource, which means that its use does not impede others to do the same. On 
the other side, empirical understanding of the field of geo-information shows that 
rivalry is artificially introduced by means of contracts. In fact nearly all geo-data 
providers, for example, restrict the degree of freedom that buyers have on the 
geo-data they pay for. Most commonly, buyers are forbidden to share data with 
other potential buyers. This actual condition, challenged by voluntary geographic 
information (VGI), not discussed here, explains why common pool resources are 
not central in our argument. 
This paper therefore aims at placing the cornerstones to conceptualize geo-
information value as price setting looking at IORs. It is not our aim to define 
univocal price-setting mechanisms, but to suggest how to (re-) conceptualize the 
issue of price setting, with a primary focus on the early stages of product 
definitions and associated pricing definitions. For sectors which are at the early 
stages of development, the value chains are not yet stable. As a result, prices are 
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established and accepted through anchoring mechanisms (Ariely, 2009). 
Anchoring mechanisms consist of practices whereby people link the value of a 
new product to other products which have accepted prices, usually within 
relatively stable value chains. The resulting price of such a new product may 
however therefore not reflect the actual value, but the initial price determines to a 
large extent how buyers and sellers start to value the product. A similar problem 
was noted by Déjean et al. (2008), when unraveling the mechanism for value 
establishment and measurement of ‘corporate responsibility’. Déjean et al. (2008) 
found that the introduction of measurement tools on corporate social 
performance was in fact not answering the needs of performance measuring and 
enhancement of the industry stakeholders, but the needs for such companies’ 
legitimacy increase in the financial sector. “Actors in the financial field are deeply 
embedded in a cognitive frame in which quantitative measurement tools matter a 
lot” (Déjean et al., 2008). Thus, the inter-organizational relations across which 
price setting takes place, affects the prices being accepted and used. Therefore 
price setting is an inter-organizational artifact, which needs to be researched by 
considering how and when prices are (or can be) formed, and along which 
relational lines what prices are actually accepted.  
We will argue in this paper that the dynamics of IORs in early stages of price 
setting largely define the value, and as a result reframe the dilemma of geo-
information value to a problem of IORs. This perspective helps to generate new 
questions and some answers. To position the discussion more thoroughly, we 
confine our research to two major questions: 
1) Which inter-organizational conditions can define or affect the process of 
geo-information price setting? 
2) When are prices set and inscribed into the IORs? 
The article is structured as follows: First, we discuss the theoretical concepts by 
which we look at price, followed by the operationalization strategy through 
descriptive data collection and interpretative analysis of cases. If price setting 
takes place along the IORs, then an information infrastructure perspective 
(Bowker and Star, 1999) to investigate how that is taking place in reality is useful. 
Next, we present the findings in each of the cases and discuss how each of the 
analytical aspects of the theoretical concepts is reflected in the cases. We 
conclude with a number of recommendations for further research.  
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
We propose to tackle our research questions from the perspective of contextual 
inter-organizational conditions within which prices are agreed upon. We start by 
two archetypical stable conditions, the market perspective and the hierarchy 
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perspective, in which the process of price setting and value creation is largely 
known and extensively described. These two are based on the traditional Max 
Weber dichotomy, but revitalized by Stone (2002) in more recent years, amongst 
others: 
- a market perspective (geo-information as object of trade, which implies value 
uncertainty at the bottom of the organization, where customers stay and 
choose), and  
- a hierarchy/bureaucratic perspective (geo-information as part of 
protocols/procedures, which implies value uncertainty at the top of the 
organization, where political/administrative decisions are taken in a directive 
manner).  
In the market perspective, price is determined by the “invisible hand” of the 
market (introduced by Adam Smith) which pulls prices down to an accepted 
equilibrium between demand and supply. According to this (neo-) classical 
economic theory (Hicks, 1975 (reprint from 1939)), continuous bargaining of 
atomic actors reduces profit margins continuously, and pushes for innovation. No 
actor is assumed to be able to set prices independently from the market 
conditions. The market is completely decentralized. Actors can act independently 
and rationally, and choose among pricing alternatives which can be associated 
with value. Value is this created at the moment of market interaction.  
The hierarchical perspective contrastingly draws on formal, procedural, relations 
(Thompson, 1991). The price is determined and managed by the top of the 
organization in a centralized manner. Actors cannot choose, but have to accept 
given prices. Prices equal value in this case, as there is no rivalry good. Value is 
thus created at the moment that the authority determines the price.   
Empirical reality does match either ideal-type, so the actual process of actual 
geo-information price setting or value creation does not follow either type. Given 
the bounded rationality in which actors have to make their choices, it is widely 
assumed that what counts is the perception of value of goods. In between the 
two models is a IORs model. In this model the product price is influenced by both 
central and decentralized levels. For example, state organizations, such as 
national mapping agencies legitimize the reliability of certain information products 
which have national importance, even through the distribution may be operated 
through commercial channels or private companies. The resulting price in such a 
dual system depends on what the state is willing to guarantee on the one hand, 
yet also on what customers are willing to pay on the other. Essentially, the price 
depends then on the changing conditions in which both providers and customers 
are interacting with each other.  
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Researching these processes empirically poses first of all the problem of what 
the most relevant empirical granularity could be. To tackle this problem we use 
three analytical aspects from information infrastructures studies (Bowker et al., 
2007; Hanseth and Monteiro, 1998), which highlight crucial points of interrelation 
between information handling and organizations: 
- accreditation, which actors can guarantee access, and what mechanisms can 
allow the use of information, 
- interoperability/integration/coalition, refers to the possibilities of establishing 
couplings between data and related activities and organizations, 
- standardization, refers both to data and to organizational processes 
compliance to common guidelines. 
These aspects do not distinguish informational and organizational dimensions a 
priori. So, they are consistent with our initial aim of not looking only at the plane 
seats. They are also mutually dependent, and can help in describing inter-
organizational processes. For example, a public body can decide what standards 
have to be used for geo-information. Nevertheless, existing systems in use in 
accredited organizations may require different strategies of data integration.  
Table 1 provides a view on the archetypes, and in where the opportunities to 
investigate existing practices of value generation in IORs are. By reviewing the 
combined set of infrastructural aspects one can not only reveal the context in 
which value creation takes place, but also whose values are actually more or less 
dominant. 
Table 1 Archetypes of IORs viewed from an infrastructural perspective 
Archetype Analytical aspects 
(infrastructural 
perspective) 
Characteristics 
Hierarchy/ 
bureaucracy 
(organizational 
uncertainty at the top) 
Accreditation Regulatory authorities; Centralized, 
independent body or regulation 
Coalition Joint ventures; Merging of organizational 
sub-parts for a negotiated task 
Standardization Franchising; Autonomy within the frame 
of controlling organization 
Market (organizational 
uncertainty at the 
bottom) 
Accreditation Peer production; Community, distributed 
acceptance 
Coalition Networks of action (Braa et al., 2004) 
Scaling of dispersed collaboration 
Standardization Sector association; Body for negotiation 
and representation of interests 
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Similar to the example given by Déjean et al. (2008), in which the emerging cost 
for corporate responsibility consultants were an indicator of the constitution of 
corporate responsibility value,  the cost and effort needed by the individual 
organizations for infrastructural activities undertaken are a proxy for the value of 
the spatial data outcome. More precisely, by investigating which price 
organizations are willing to pay or be paid (in terms of money or other forms of 
resources): 
- to join an accredited arena, and/or 
- to make their data interoperable and used in other settings, and/or to adopt 
information and procedures from other settings, and/or 
- to embrace a standard, 
we can identify an indirect and original entry point in understanding geo-
information price setting. In addition, by evaluating how spin-off activities of IORs 
dealing with geo-information sharing create extra activities for individual 
organizations, we can derive a bigger picture of the value of the geo-information. 
3. DATA COLLECTION METHOD AND CASES 
We selected three geo-related IORs cases from the Netherlands where working 
with spatial data is among the prime objectives of establishing the IOR. All IORs 
represent relations of and between municipalities, and all IORs represent 
municipal spatial data which need to be exchanged and shared. This limitation in 
cases shows firstly that different IORs coexist in one location, and secondly that 
different value systems exist simultaneously. 
The three analytical aspects of the infrastructure perspective were the elements 
to review in our cases. The approach to data collection was largely open-ended, 
and aimed at an explanatory account of geo-information use. More concretely, 
data sources included selected relevant documents, publications through the 
websites, newsletters and face-to-face interviews with municipal staff working in 
geo-information (related) departments, senior managers and geo-information 
managers of the National Cadastral organization, Dataland, and process 
managers of the national association of municipalities. The data related to 
DIMPACT were retrieved through interviews with staff from the DIMPACT 
coordination bureau and Dimpact member municipalities, and Dimpact related 
(hardcopy and digital copy) documentation.  
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Table 2 Cases of IORs with geo-information 
IOR Parties involved Main objective of 
cooperation 
Geo-aspects 
National Cadastre 
with 443 individual 
municipalities 
www.kadaster.nl 
 
1 National 
Cadastre, 443 
municipalities 
Exchange of basic 
objects, including 
parcels  
Standards of base 
data, including 
parcels, addresses, 
buildings 
Dataland 
www.dataland.nl 
360 municipalities 
(July 2009) 
Making object data 
of municipalities 
accessible to 
government, citizens 
and private parties 
 
Distribution of 
Geodata of 
municipalities to third 
parties 
DIMPACT 
www.dimpact.nl 
14 municipalities 
(July 2009) – 
mostly in east of 
Netherlands  
 
Joint Development 
of front/mid/back 
office for 
municipalities 
Creation of joint geo-
viewing solutions 
 
The interpretation of these combined data was qualitative, because our intention 
was to seek qualitative categories and patterns in an analytical way, rather than 
testing hypotheses quantitatively.  The main focus of the interpretation was on 
how the infrastructural dimensions introduced before can explain actual activities 
and organizational patterns in relation to geo-information, i.e. concepts of 
accreditation, coalition and standard were used as a common lens to look at the 
three cases discussed here. 
4. FINDINGS 
4.1. Cadastre-municipalities case 
The relation of the Cadastre with municipalities is quite complex and has grown 
historically.  As de Vries (2009) describes, data on geometry of parcels are 
collected by the Cadastre and provided to municipalities. Data on people are 
collected by municipalities and shared with the Cadastre for the purpose of 
ownerships, heritance, etc. Data on buildings are the responsibility of 
municipalities, but collected by the Cadastre on behalf of the municipalities. Data 
on addresses are collected by municipalities, but managed by the Cadastre. Data 
on public rights need to be registered by municipalities, but are in fact registered 
in the Cadastre. This intertwined set of relationships has made it confusing at 
times who is playing which strategic card on whose behalf. It was however noted 
regularly that the historically grown situation has been problematic at times, 
because each actor aimed at getting hold of the same geo-information. 
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In essence, we can say that the accreditation related to the data through a 
negotiated process with user groups and with the Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and Environment (‘VROM’ is the Dutch abbreviation). The accreditation 
consists of both the quality procedures on the data done by the national Cadastre 
organization, and of the prices of cadastral products, proposed by the Cadastre 
and approved by VROM. The aggregate of prices primarily reflect the total cost 
needed to produce and distribute the cadastral data. The data produced by the 
municipalities are not directly sold by the national Cadastre; yet, the Cadastre 
organization uses these data in the infrastructure and maintenance provisions. 
The rules which guide access and distribution are technically set by the National 
Cadastre. The accreditation can thus be largely contributed to the realm of 
activities and regulations of the National Cadastre. 
The coalition between the National Cadastre with municipalities is made up by 
individual bilateral contracts, which are backed by national laws (Cadastral law, 
key registrations, INSPIRE Directive). This coalition is however subject to any 
change in the national legislation, not directly but indirectly. For example, any 
new legislation which devolves certain responsibilities to municipalities (such as 
the key registration act of buildings and addresses) immediately influences the 
coalition, and the space that individual parties have in the coalition. Yet, this 
regulatory environment does not prescribe how the respective parties define their 
individual agreements. 
The standardization activities with regards to data and information processes 
along this set of coalitions are largely guided by the National Cadastre. This is 
not unexpected. The basic Cadastral law, and the associated organizational law 
Cadastre, and the law related to the Key registrations Cadastre, Topography and 
Geometry form the basis on which the organization carries out its activities. As a 
result, the Cadastre organization aims to streamline the form of data collection 
and the activities related to data provision. Even though individual municipalities 
would prefer other types of cadastral or topographic data formats and procedures, 
the Cadastre may use the argument of required harmonization, expressed in the 
laws, as key argument why they should lead the standardization process.   
Moreover, besides the formal (legal) channels between the Cadastre 
organization and the municipalities, there are various informal channels where 
the parties meet. One is through regular negotiations with the National 
association of municipalities (‘VNG’ is the Dutch abbreviation).  
All in all, the three dimensions show a strong position of the Cadastre in relation 
to the individual municipalities. But, there are also several accounts of problems 
on the accreditation and standardization (Coumans, 2007), and in particular 
when it comes to the issue of prices, and the price sets. The main bottleneck 
hereby concerned the fee structure set by the Cadastre. Although the Cadastre is 
handling a public task it is doing so through a private company-like management 
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practice. The fees are set, be it in negotiation and after approval by VROM, yet 
the Cadastral organization changes its fees following economic conjunctures. 
Despite this private management-like practice one could argue that it is not 
consumers of the products and services through which prices are set, yet a top-
down control mechanism of the Cadastre’s expenses.  In 2008 the total revenue 
of the Cadastral organization was €204 million, while the expenditure comprised 
254 million. Over the years the Cadastre has made however a profit leaving the 
organization with an own equity of €8.4 million in 2008.† However with the rapid 
changes in the housing market and the global economic crisis, the equity of the 
Cadastre has become far below the required threshold, which forced the 
Cadastre to raise its prices. These conjuncture market differences thus 
influenced the price setting in addition to the hierarchical processes of price 
setting. Municipalities, on the other hand, have their own yearly budgets for 
cadastre related activities, although it is difficult to distinct cadastre related 
activities from other geo-information related activities. Moreover, the problem for 
many municipalities is that different trajectories are imposed from national 
authorities related to geo-information related registration. It is difficult to anticipate 
or cater for all those trajectories.  
4.2. Dataland case 
The cooperation Dataland comprises of joined municipalities, the foundation 
administration Dataland and the Corporation Dataland. Municipalities can join the 
coalition on a voluntary basis. As contributing member municipalities both 
constitute Dataland (set the rules) and also comply with Dataland (live by the 
rules).  Once they become a member there are however implications of the 
membership. They have to submit their geo-data periodically to the Dataland 
office. Dataland in turn agrees to pay 5% of the revenue generated based on the 
data from the associated municipality, to cover for the cost made by the 
municipality to make the delivery in order. The minimal frequency of delivery is 
twice a year, but occasionally this happens more often, for example when there 
are many recent data mutations. The Dataland bureau is responsible for the 
accreditation. They check the data on completeness, accuracy and actuality (in 
total 41 criteria), and publish these validation results through a quality monitor. 
This quality monitor aims to serve two purposes: 
1) It provides the individual municipalities with the possibility to correct or 
update their data and/or underlying work processes, if wanted. 
2) It increases trust by third party customers, because of the existence of a 
quality process.  
                                                
† Data from http://kadaster.nl/jaarverslag/2008/pdf/kort.pdf  
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The quality process also makes sure that the quality of all the distributed data is 
fairly harmonious, so the quality indicator is a measure for the standardization. 
Translated to activity costs, we can also say the both the activity of quality 
checking and quality publication of the Dataland bureau and the activities related 
to revision by the individual municipalities make up the total (voluntary) activities 
of standardization.   
The governing board of Dataland is made up of six representatives of (mostly 
medium to larger sized) municipalities and a representative from the association 
of municipalities (VNG). In 2008 Dataland had made 300 million building data 
with address attributes available. The 2008 activa/passiva comprised €363,779.‡  
4.3. DIMPACT case 
DIMPACT is organized as a coalition of voluntary members. Similar as in 
Dataland the members can be active in the policy and setting of priorities of the 
cooperation, and they have influence in the operational management of the 
cooperation. Each participating municipality has an equal vote, regardless of the 
size of the municipality.  The members coordinate the provision of services and 
systems to member municipalities. The cost structure is such that DIMPACT 
makes use of the staff and knowledge of municipalities themselves with the 
support of a small coordinating bureau. No external consultants are hired in. The 
idea is that management and development costs are shared by the members, in 
order to generate opportunities and advantages of scale, standardization of 
processes, operational efficiency and decrease of overall costs of individual 
members. The DIMPACT bureau works on a not-for-profit basis§ on the level of 
accreditation. Although the weights among members in the decisions of 
DIMPACT as a whole are equal, it is not surprising that the larger municipalities 
have a bigger role to play, simply because of their larger number of human 
resources. One could also raise the question whether cost reductions are made if 
people have to do the work internally anyway. The cost reduction comes through 
the sharing and trading off of experiences from one municipality to the other. The 
gain is in the fees generated for the electronic services, in the expectation that 
the presence of electronic services will increase the number of services provided 
on the one hand, but also the income generated by electronic services on the 
other hand. 
 
                                                
‡ Data from http://www.dataland.nl/images/dataland/PDFS/Jaarverslagen/jaarverslag%202008.pdf  
§ Generated revenue is invested in the cooperation. 
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4.4. In summary 
Table 3 Findings of information infrastructural aspects per case  
IOR Accreditation Coalition Standardization 
National 
Cadastre with 
individual 
municipalities 
The Cadastre 
Organization 
largely 
determines the 
quality and prices 
of all data, yet 
requires 
ministerial 
approval for their 
pricing policy for 
data distribution. 
Coalitions are based 
on a large number of 
individual contracts 
between the 
Cadastre and 
individual 
municipalities. 
National legislation of 
key registers 
distributes 
responsibilities.  
 
All operational 
standards are 
primarily 
determined by the 
Cadastral 
Organization. Most 
standards are 
formalized in 
national 
legislation. 
Price standards 
result from a 
negotiated 
process. 
 
Dataland Dataland 
accredits 
individual 
municipalities by  
a yearly quality 
price to a single 
municipality 
Dataland is a 
cooperative of 
municipalities with 
Dataland foundation 
and Dataland 
corporation, and an 
executive Bureau 
Dataland. The 
Dataland central 
Bureau administers 
memberships, and 
coordinates cohesion 
among members. 
The Dataland 
Bureau sets 
validation rules, 
and applies these 
rules to check data 
of individual 
municipalities.  
Prices are set by 
individual 
municipalities, yet 
Dataland gets 
funded through 
some of the 
revenue. 
DIMPACT Technical 
representatives 
of individual 
municipalities 
agree on 
technical 
solutions, 
including specific 
GIS solutions.  
 
An executive bureau 
Dimpact coordinates 
the alignment at 
technical and policy 
level. Municipalities 
are voluntary 
members of the 
Dimpact association; 
 
Standards result 
from the technical 
solutions for 
problems within 
the e-service 
provision of 
individual 
members. 
Individual 
municipalities set 
their own fees for 
electronic 
services.  
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5. DISCUSSION 
Through the empirical material presented, we identified a relevant area for the 
understanding of geo-data price setting, which is characterized by a non-
crystallized value chain, therefore by high uncertainty among members in the 
chain in price setting. Possibly, the stabilization of the value chain would affect 
price uncertainty. At this early stage of development of the sector, we claim that 
prices are anchored to other activities along the existing inter-organizational 
relations. 
The three cases are different for functioning, history, tradition, etc but they are 
empirically linked and analytically coherent, as they comprise related actors in 
different inter-organizational arrangements. Theoretically, they are presented 
through the same conceptual lens derived from information infrastructures 
research. This double overlapping allows seeing how Cadastre, Dataland and 
Dimpact are interlinked along three dimensions: accreditation, standard, coalition. 
So, rather than seeing individual organizations, we see a spatial data 
infrastructure developing along existing IORs. As it can be noted from the cases, 
municipalities play a crucial level in handling geo-information. Therefore, with the 
development of inter-organizational geo-information sharing, they tend to become 
hubs of an SDI, and the hubs contain the location where the validity of prices is 
mostly felt.  
What does this mean in light of our first research question? “Which inter-
organizational conditions can define or affect the process of geo-information price 
setting?” A first condition which seems determinant at first sight is the regulatory 
system in which prices relate to the inter-organizational agreements. The first 
case (Cadastre) shows that fees are used to balance organizational budgets, in 
particular those of the Cadastral organization. But this cost recovery condition 
cannot be labeled as a market-oriented process per se, because there is no 
competition on the cadastral prices, and as a result there is no clear benchmark 
against which one can label the resulting and actual prices as fair or unfair. One 
could say that the prices are decided in a quasi monopoly fashion. However, from 
the perspective of municipalities a considerable amount of activities are set aside 
to meet the requirements of the Cadastre, on the one hand to comply with 
national legislation, but on the other hand on a voluntary basis, because the data 
can immediately be used for other internal information processes and services. 
Thus, the willingness to allocate resources for this extra workload as a result of 
being involved in the cooperative effort is a direct indication of the value that 
these municipalities give to the data, even though it is difficult to quantify this 
value in money terms. However, the presence of this value influences the 
willingness to pay a certain fee.  
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The voluntary aspect of engaging in IORs is stronger in the other two cases. In 
the cases of Dataland and Dimpact, this implies that top-down strategy of 
coercing a certain price is not possible, because the membership of 
municipalities to either Dataland or Dimpact is voluntary. Even though the 
agreement states that once parties have joined they have to stick to the general 
rules; yet there is no hard enforcement instrument other than a civil court case. 
This downplays the relevance of conventional transaction cost theory as 
described by (North, 1990) amongst others, to explain the price setting conditions. 
It is not so much the extra effort to enable the transaction which determines the 
price.  Nor is it the extra coercion effort to enforce a certain price. So, the 
institutional conditions in which the actors join up do not seem to determine the 
price setting. Instead there is a tendency towards voluntary compliance to certain 
prices which are set by the cooperative, or even by a single organization. Once 
this price is found reasonable by one, the others follow. This voluntary 
compliance process is what (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) refer to as normative 
and or mimetic isomorphism as opposed to coercive isomorphism. Within the 
organizational field of geo-information use in the Netherlands, voluntary 
agreements, professional and peer relations work as regulatory artifacts. Indeed, 
the actual degree of voluntarism in the latter two cases may be questioned. 
Currently, 360 (out of 443) municipalities have joined Dataland, leaving still some 
80 municipalities not part of such coalition. Most of the members and non-
members are geographically clustered. It sustains the idea that location, historical 
cooperation and other path of informal cooperation influence to join or not join 
Dataland, therefore -indirectly- standardization. In addition, not all members are 
equally active and participative in Dataland. The Dataland bureau has installed a 
regular price for a member who delivers the highest quality (‘Chapeau’ price), as 
an incentive to maintain quality. The price also acts as an incentive to bond 
among members, and as a way to increase legitimacy. Also this aspect pinpoints 
the hypothesis that the value of geo-information is not to be found in the 
information itself, but through anchoring it in existing relations to which it takes 
part. 
Our second research question is “When are prices set and inscribed into the 
IORs?” A first remark is that trying to understand the price setting mechanism by 
tracing where budgets came from does not seem to be a promising path. In fact, 
the actual amount of money that is made available for the organization of key 
registers at local level is none, while for other public sector innovation projects, 
e.g. “a different government” (in Dutch: ‘Andere Overheid’)  is considerable. As 
one municipal staff put it: 
For the whole internal management Group ‘Andere Overheid’ our municipality 
reserved 1,2 million euros… that’s quite an amount. Especially, considering that 
we have to economize on our regular operational processes... So, if they tell me 
that I have to re-organize the geo-information processes, than I have to use this 
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money. At the same time I receive new regulations from all sorts of ministries, but 
they don't give me any additional funds. I am in a continuous split. 
This quote shows that the price setting of geo-information cannot be directly 
traced back to the time when dedicated geo-information investments were made 
or regulations were set. It is almost coincidental that geo-information processes 
are re-organized to cater for municipal geo-information products which can be 
provided to third parties. Tracing the increase of prices leads in this case to 
tracing the internal and external networks in which the organization is willingly or 
unwillingly involved, or anchored.    
Furthermore, the fact that a number of respondents from municipalities are highly 
critical of the prices set by the Cadastre does not influence the price setting. The 
prices are set though a negotiation process of the Cadastre with the Ministry. 
However, the time at which any price is fixed is not intrinsically related to any 
attribute of the geo-information itself, rather it relates to the IORs and 
dependencies in which the Cadastre is hooked.    
Finally, in the cases of Dataland and Dimpact the criticism deals in particular with 
the limited degree of influence that individual members can exert in the 
cooperative agreements, including those involving prices and budgets. This 
makes the dimension of coalition, as one which could help in explaining price 
setting, the most uncertain one among the three infrastructure dimensions.  Still, 
it is clear that the municipal staff form increasingly the nodes between such 
coalitions and these constitute the main contact points to experience the prices.  
The Dataland and Dimpact examples of organizational and decision structure 
show that lower level governments can join up and create their own decision and 
standardization processes. These processes may counterbalance nationally led 
processes of geo-information management. This would imply that local level 
values are incrementally inscribed in the system. Indeed, local officers ask for it 
explicitly, when complaining that there is no money for geo-information activities 
and they have to use other budgets. On the other hand, in most cases the actual 
implementation of ICT is conducted in close connection or even in subcontracts 
to the private sector. The actual implementation at national level is often 
conducted by the same private companies as at local levels or at cooperative 
local levels. The question therefore remains whether local public values truly find 
their way into the measurement system. The activities that this generates are 
worth to be explored further, empirically and theoretically. The hypotheses we 
pose for further research are: 
- Some sort of price (in terms of fees or resources to be shared with the 
coalition) will consolidate over time to obtain accreditation. 
International Journal of Spatial Data Infrastructures Research, 2010, Vol. 5, 77-95 
 92
- Positive or negative incentives (prices, fines, bonus/malus, etc.) will regulate 
compliance to geo-information standards (data quality, use of interoperable 
data models and technologies) within the infrastructure. 
Empirically, municipalities are a crucial point of encounter of the sets of IORs 
considered. Looking at them as hubs of a SDI, explaining what tensions they are 
intertwined with, can shed new light on geo-information value. From this 
perspective ‘street level’ public sector officers offer a good viewpoint, being at the 
intersection of geo-information production and use. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Overall, examining the IOR cases in the Netherlands has shown that the 
infrastructural aspects provide original insights in how to evaluate value 
development. The cases have shown that many geo-related IORs are in fact 
inter-connected, which implies that examining value generation in individual 
cases or in individual organizations is likely to result in blurred results. Value 
exists throughout the network, and can therefore not be evaluated in isolation of 
the characteristics of the network. Value arises at the moment that these network 
relations emerge, or at the moment that these network relations are created. With 
changing network relations, prices may thus change over time. That is why we 
refer to the importance to study “relationality”, in terms of entanglement 
(Orlikowski and Scott, 2008) of information technology (spatial data 
infrastructures, in this case) and organizations. 
In addition, this explorative analysis identified an interesting tension between the 
trend towards more autonomous cooperation among smaller public organizations 
and organizations which are lower in the administrative hierarchy. Contrastingly, 
the national and larger organizations still tend to take the lead in major top-down 
decision trajectories, because they have the human resource and financial 
capacity to do so.  The resulting value generation by each of these trajectories is 
different, hence giving the intersection of these two processes, being the 
municipalities, difficulties in setting prices for their geo-related products and 
services. Looking at the individual value chains of the municipal geo-related 
products would not explain this difficulty, but linking this problem to the processes 
in two different networks would. That’s why linking value creation and price 
setting to IORs is useful.   
Although this research has addressed a number of issues on how the IORs 
conditions shape value, the investigation led us to two general questions which 
we propose to the readers: 
- What the most relevant empirical granularity (of IORs) to look at price setting 
would be? 
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- How the examples of the Netherlands would compare to examples in other 
developed countries, and whether similar examples from developing 
countries would resemble these findings? 
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